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Abstract 
This is the third in a series of papers focusing reasoning-and-proving. Participants were in-service teachers 
enrolled in a continuing university education programme in teaching mathematics for grades 5–10. Data 
were collected from a course assignment in 2018 and 2019, where the in-service teachers reported about 
their students’ work with a reasoning-and-proving task. Their reports included an identification of the 
levels the students’ written argumentation reached, based on Balacheff’s taxonomy of proofs. The course 
assignment’s instructions were expanded for the 2019-cohort. Comparing in-service teachers’ proof level 
identifications to the researchers’ by statistical analyses, indicated an improvement of the general quality 
from 2018 to 2019. A higher consensus in 2019 included identifying generic arguments and an 
understanding that there might be examples falling outside of the taxonomy levels. Qualitative content 
analysis of the two cohorts’ justifications of their identifications revealed an improved understanding of 
what is considered generic argumentation. The results encourage and contribute to further developments 
of the concept. 
Keywords: Balacheff’s four levels of proofs, identification of student arguments, mathematical 
reasoning-and-proving, written imaginary dialogues 
Introduction 
There is a shortage of research regarding how to prepare pre- or in-service teachers in 
engaging their students in proving activities in primary and lower secondary classroom 
(Stylianides, 2016). The aim for this paper is to add knowledge to this gap. This is the third paper 
in a series of papers focusing on studies on teaching of mathematical reasoning-and-proving. The 
subjects in the papers are in-service teachers (ISTs) from across Norway enrolled in the first term 
of Year 1 of a continuing university mathematics education for grades 5‒10 (students of age 10 
to 15) in the national strategy “Competence for Quality”. ISTs in the online programme prepared 
and implemented a reasoning-and-proving task to their students. The mathematical problem was 
presented for the students as a dialogue, where two fictitious pupils already had taken the initial 
steps in discussing the task. Pairs of students were to continue the dialogue and put their arguments 
in writing. ISTs approached students’ mathematical thinking processes in their imaginary 
dialogues (Wille, 2017) and analysed students’ written arguments based on Balacheff’s (1988) 
taxonomy of proofs, which classifies four hierarchical levels of thinking: naïve empiricism, 




crucial experiment, generic example, thought experiment. 
Each study in this series explored the combination of a mathematical task, the method of 
imaginary dialogues, and a taxonomy for analysis. The first study (Brodahl & Wathne, 2018), 
drawn on 2016-participants, investigated perceptions of first experiences with the complex 
combination as a whole, the second (Wathne & Brodahl, 2019), drawn on 2017-participants, the 
usefulness of the particular method and taxonomy, as perceived by the teachers. The current study 
of participants from 2018 and 2019 is independent from the previous two studies. It focused on 
the quality of ISTs’ proof level identifications and the impact of expanding instructions for the 
2019-cohort with a preparation brief on possible pitfalls in proof level identifications. 
When we assessed the project reports from 2018, we noticed shortcomings in the proof 
level identifications made by ISTs. These observations resulted in a development of the task 
instructions for the course in 2019. We briefed on potential pitfalls and added a short video to 
support ISTs in their work. When assessing the reports from 2019, our impression was that the 
quality of the ISTs’ proof level identifications had improved. However, that notion raised an 
important issue: How could we know that there really was any improvement of quality of the 
identifications? That issue led us to the first research question of this paper. 
On average, 90.5% of ISTs from the 2018 and 2019 cohorts perceived Balacheff’s 
taxonomy for classifying levels of proofs to be useful; whereas 54.1% perceived challenges in 
identifying proof levels in their students’ written dialogues, and 59.5% found explaining their 
identifications to be challenging. Because it is important to distinguish invalid and valid proof 
argumentation in primary and lower secondary school (Ministry of Education and Research, 2020; 
Stylianides, 2016), these ISTs’ perceptions indicated the understanding of what counts as a valid 
proof might need to be improved. Thus, as teacher educators, we concluded that we needed to 
know how to better facilitate ISTs in identifying the third level in Balacheff’s taxonomy, the 
generic example. This insight could, in turn, help teacher educators in improving their instructions 
when adapting the concept ‘a task, a method and a taxonomy’ to develop ISTs’ proficiency of 
teaching reasoning-and-proving. This issue led us to the second research question of this paper. 
Subsequently, we developed the following research questions: 
1. How did the quality of in-service teachers’ proof level identifications of their students’ 
work with a reasoning-and-proving task change from 2018 to 2019? 
2. What justifications do in-service teachers suggest when they incorrectly identify the proof 
level “the generic example” in students’ reasoning and proving? 
The paper describes two trails associated with the two research questions. The first 
research question in this observational study was treated as well by a statistical approach to 
examine if there existed a change in the quality of the identifications, as by a qualitative approach 
to describe some of these changes. The second research question was explored by a qualitative 
content analysis. 






This study investigated how ISTs identified their students’ mathematical arguments used 
in a reasoning-and-proving process. The definition of “proof” and conceptualisation of the 
meaning of proof in school mathematics that guided the current study, come from A. Stylianides 
(2007): “Proof is a mathematical argument, a connected sequence of assertions for and against a 
mathematical claim” (p. 291). The argumentation uses statements accepted by the classroom 
community and forms of reasoning and communication known by or within the conceptual reach 
of the classroom community. 
The study followed G. Stylianides (2008) using the term “reasoning-and-proving” to 
encompass the breadth of the activity associated with identifying patterns, making conjectures, 
providing proofs, and providing non-proof arguments (p. 9). His analytical framework (p. 10) 
captures activities involved in reasoning-and-proving. Four of them are identified in Balacheff’s 
(1988) taxonomy of proofs and used to categorise different levels of mathematical arguments: 
“naïve empiricism”, “crucial experiment”, “generic example” and “thought experiment” (p. 218). 
The terms naïve empiricism and crucial experiment are acknowledged as special kinds of 
empirical arguments for or against a mathematical claim, as example-based reasoning, but not as 
valid proofs. Due to the taxonomy, only level 4 counts as a rigorous proof, although even level 3 
requires general argumentation similar to a formal proof. A generic example is in terms of A. 
Stylianides’ (2007) proof definition, a valid mode of proving a conjecture, using a particular case 
seen as representative of the general case, while thought experiment constitutes formally 
established modes of mathematical proof. 
The current study drew on ISTs’ application of Balacheff’s taxonomy of mathematical 
proofs to identify how far the students’ argumentation reached on their way to a valid proof of a 
mathematical conjecture. Using the same conjecture as in the course assignment, Figure 1 
illustrates examples of elements to be considered. The conjecture was to argue that there are n2 
blocks in an n step up-and-down staircase. 
Stylianides and Stylianides (2009) regarded the particular case, chosen as a generic 
example, to illustrate a prototype offering conclusive evidence for the truth of a mathematical 
generalisation. Because all cases are considered when a particular case is used as representative 
of the general case, such cases do not have empirical status (p. 315). However, there are subjective 
aspects “to the acceptance of a generic proof as a proof, even within the same community of 
observers” (Zaslavsky, 2018, p. 295) and little consensus in literature on what constitutes a generic 
example (Doğan, 2020; Rø & Arnesen, 2020). Reid and Vargas (2018) suggested that generic 
examples in written work of students can be considered as both generic and empirical, depending 
on the reader’s reasoning and reconstruction, and what is accepted within a certain community. 
They claimed two criteria for valid generic arguments: the evidence of awareness of generality, 
and the mathematical evidence of reasoning (p. 17). Rø and Arnesen (2020) expanded these claims 




for examples providing a proof, that respectively “the argument concludes with the general claim 
that was to be proved”, and “the argument contains both a mathematical reasoning concerning the 
example [...], as well as an explicit lifting of this reasoning to the general case” (p. 3). 
Figure 1 
Glimpses of arguments for the conjecture “There are n2 blocks in an n step up-and-down staircase 
built from blocks”, considered categorised according to the levels of Balacheff’s (1988) taxonomy 
of proofs 
 
In this paper, we followed A. Stylianides (2016) and other researchers (e.g. Rowland, 
1998; G. Stylianides, 2008) regarding the strength and importance of the generic example in 
education, to lay in its potential as a didactic tool in school at all levels, as this level of abstraction 
is in accessible reach. The generic example was seen to help students discover the general in the 
particular and having the power to convince, as well as explain, and serve both as a mean in itself 
and supplying a mean to bridge the gap between informal arguments and more formal proof (Rø 
& Arnesen, 2020). 
 
Methods 
Our two research questions were partly explored by different methods. In this section, 
we present methods common for both research questions: the setting for this study, the sample, 
the analytic tool used to describe which proof levels were presents in the dialogues, and how this 




analytic tool was employed to generate data. To facilitate the reading, analysis methods used in 
one trail of the investigation only, will be presented in the results section. 
The data in this study came from a mandatory course assignment: IST should prepare and 
implement a reasoning-and-proving task to their students, with the mathematical problem 
presented as a dialogue between two fictitious pupils. The mathematical problem was about how 
to find the number of blocks in a specific pattern (Figure 2). The direct way is to add the number 
of blocks in each row or column, but the fictitious pupils in the initial dialogue “building up-and-
down staircases” (http://bit.ly/buildingupanddownstaircases) suggest that a quicker way to find 
the number of blocks is by computing the square of the figure’s number. 
Figure 2 
Up-and-down staircases built from blocks 
 
 
The students’ task was to continue the imaginary dialogue and prove that the square will 
always give the correct result. After the session, ISTs wrote a report, including three continuing 
dialogues produced by their students, followed by an identification of the levels of the 
mathematical argumentation in these dialogues, based on Balacheff’s taxonomy of proofs. Our 
primary data consisted of the students’ written argumentation, and ISTs’ identifications of proof 
levels including justifications of their choices. 
The study drew on the project reports from all ISTs from the cohorts in 2018 and 2019, 
who gave their informed consent to participate. Excluding reports from ISTs’ teaching classes for 
non-Norwegian speakers gave 37 participants (out of 56) from the 2018 cohort (aged 27 to 55), 
and 31 participants (out of 48) from the 2019 cohort (aged 28 to 54). Their classes ranged in 2018 
from grade 4 to 11 (age 9 to 16), and in 2019 from grade 5 to 11. 
After excluding reports where students’ argumentations were not presented as dialogues, 
the remaining 186 dialogues and the corresponding identifications constituted our sample. In 
2018, there were 33 dialogues from primary school, 65 from lower secondary, and 3 from first 
year at upper secondary level. The corresponding numbers from 2019 were 21, 61 and 3. All 
project reports were anonymised before analysis. 
The reports should include which Balacheff levels ISTs identified in each dialogue, and a 
justification for their decision. In our analysis, we categorised these texts written by ISTs by 
marking which of Balacheff’s levels we interpreted ISTs had identified. However, we found the 
four levels of Balacheff’s taxonomy to fall short, for example when an IST reported “the students 
have started a reasoning towards level 3, but they are not close to finishing their proof”. We found 
it unsatisfactory either to mark level 3, or to not at all expose that IST had identified some 
reasoning at this level. Hence, we developed an analytic tool, which also included precursors for 




each of the four levels in Balacheff’s taxonomy. In addition, there were dialogues falling outside 
of Balacheff’s taxonomy, as no argumentation for the validity of the suggested formula existed. 
We chose to identify such dialogues as ‘category 0.’ 
Thus, our analytic tool consisted of nine categories, 0, p1, 1, p2, 2, p3, 3, p4 and 4. The 
prefix p indicated the precursor for the numbered levels. Category 0 was used for argumentations 
falling outside of Balacheff’s taxonomy and constituted the only category that cannot be combined 
with any other category. Arguments categorised as p1 comprise students giving a single example 
with few blocks and showing that n2 gives the right number. Argumentation categorised as 
category 1 (identical to Balacheff’s level 1 – naïve empiricism) meant the students showed that n2 
gives the correct number of blocks for a few examples. Examples of p2 comprise students showing 
that n2 works for several examples, but they did not try an example where the number of blocks 
was distinctly higher than in the other examples. Category 2 (crucial experiment) meant the 
students showed that n2 will give the correct number for a staircase with many blocks. That is, the 
students became convinced of the validity of the formula, by applying it on a more advanced 
example. Arguments in category p3 comprise students for specific examples claiming the staircase 
can be rearranged to a square, but not arguing for why this is always possible. An argumentation 
where the students, in addition, showed that every staircase can be rearranged as a square, was 
identified as category 3 (generic example). Arguments in category p4 comprise starting an 
algebraic proof, but not finishing. Category 4 (thought experiment) would usually be a complete 
proof. In this task, that would be likely to be a proof by induction. Overall, one dialogue might 
contain arguments on more than one category, however a level and its precursor exclude each 
other. 
The 186 dialogues were scrutinized by three researchers, first individually, and then 
together to agree on which categories ISTs had identified. In addition, these three researchers 
made their own analysis on which categories were present in these dialogues, independently of 
what categories ISTs had identified. The identifications made by ISTs and by the researchers were 
then compared for each dialogue. This was made to investigate how the disagreement changed 
from 2018 to 2019. 
 
Results 
We will present the results in two subsections, one for each research question. In each 
subsection, we will explain the analysis methods used to answer the corresponding research 
question only. 
The Quality of ISTs’ Identifications of Categories 
In this subsection, we present results regarding how well ISTs succeeded in their 
identifications of Balacheff’s levels in students’ argumentation. The quality was measured 
through comparisons between ISTs’ and the researchers’ identifications, first on the whole dataset, 




then on dialogues where ISTs identified any generic argument (category p3 or 3). We chose to 
focus on these categories, because reasoning-and-proving at a general level is important for 
students’ learning (Rowland, 1998; Rø & Arnesen, 2020; A. Stylianides, 2016; G. Stylianides, 
2008), as well as a core element in the syllabus for compulsory school in Norway (Ministry of 
Education and Research, 2020). The notion of ‘disagreement’ between ISTs and the 
researchers, was central in our comparisons and connected to the notion of ‘quality’ of ISTs’ 
identifications. Disagreement described differences in the identifications of categories due to our 
analytic tool. We used the researchers’ agreed identification of categories as a unanimous 
conclusion and treated it as the correct solution. Thus, low disagreement between the IST’s and 
the researchers’ identifications on a dialogue was equivalent to high quality of that IST’s 
identifications.  At the end of this subsection, we also explore ISTs’ use, or rather lack of use, of 
category 0, that is the category for dialogues falling outside of Balacheff’s taxonomy. 
Comparison of all dialogues. We constructed an algorithm to measure the disagreement between 
ISTs and the researchers for each dialogue in the cohorts 2018 and 2019. The algorithm has three 
different types of disagreement, named A, B and C, graded from minor (A) to major (C). The 
algorithm does not distinguish whether it was the IST or the researchers who identified a category, 
only that the other had not. Thus, in the following explanation of types of disagreement, IST and 
the researchers can always be swapped. 
Disagreement A is disagreement inside one of Balacheff’s levels (e.g. IST identified 1 and 
the researchers identified p1). In dialogue 1 in Table 2, there is one disagreement of type A. 
Disagreement B is applied for disagreements between Balacheff’s levels 1 and 2 (e.g. IST 
identified p2, and the researchers identified 1) as in dialogue 2 in Table 2. That gives two 
disagreements of type B, since each identified a category that the other did not. If IST identified 
categories 1 and 2, and the researchers identified 1, as in dialogue 3, then both agreed on category 
1. The only disagreement is that Identification I included 2, which means one disagreement B. 
Disagreement C is any other disagreement between categories (e.g. IST identified 3 and 
the researchers neither p3 nor 3). In dialogue 1, category 3 has no equivalent in Identification II, 
which gives one disagreement C. Notice that the categories at Balacheff’s levels 1 and 2 also can 
generate disagreements of type C. If IST identified category 2, that means disagreement C if the 
researchers did not identify any of the categories at level 1 or 2. Only if the researchers identified 
p1 or 1, that IST’s identification of category 2 would change to disagreement B. 
It remained to decide what coefficients to assign the three types of disagreement. Our 
choice was to let A = 0.5, B = 0.7 and C = 1.5, based on that type C by far is the most serious 
disagreement, and that two disagreements of type B should be less serious than one of type C. For 
each dialogue, the total disagreement between IST and the researchers is obtained by adding all 
coefficients connected to the types of disagreements identified. 
Table 1 demonstrates how to apply this algorithm. For example, in dialogue 1, there is one 




disagreement of type A and one of type C, which means the measure of the disagreement is 0.5 + 
1.5 = 2.0. 
 
Table 1 
Examples of measuring disagreements 
Dialogue Identification  Disagreement 
 I II  ABC Value 
1 1, 3 p1  1A+1C 2.0 
2 2 p1  2B 1.4 
3 1, 2 1  1B 0.7 
4 3 p3  1A 0.5 
5 1, 2, 3 2  1B+1C 2.2 
Note. Comparison of identifications for dialogues. Identifications consist of categories checked. 
Disagreement is calculated for A = 0.5, B = 0.7 and C = 1.5. 
By using this algorithm, each of the 101 dialogues from 2018 and the 85 from 2019 got a 
measure of the disagreement between IST and the researchers. Our hypothesis, based on our first 
impression, was that the disagreement had decreased from 2018 to 2019. A comparison of the 
mean values of the disagreement suggested this to be true. The mean value decreased from 2.009 
to 1.735. However, a t-test showed this change not to be significant (p = 0.0975 > 0.05). This 
meant, we could not surely conclude that the decrease was likely to be because of improvement 
in the ISTs’ identifications. 
To point at statistical significance would have been a strength in our claim that the quality 
of ISTs’ identifications was higher in 2019. Despite the fact that the data indicated this endeavour 
failed, our impression was that there still existed an improvement, evidenced by the qualitative 
data; hence, we will now focus on these dialogues identified as category p3 or 3 by ISTs. Since 
reasoning at a general level is of special importance (cf. Rowland, 1998; Rø & Arnesen, 2020; A. 
Stylianides, 2016; G. Stylianides, 2008), our impression might be connected to identifications at 
this level. 
Comparisons of dialogues identified as category p3 or 3. When this study was conducted, one 
core element in the forthcoming mathematics syllabus for grades 1–10 was “reasoning and 
argumentation” (Ministry of Education and Research, 2020). Arguments at the highest level in 
Balacheff’s taxonomy (thought experiment) require an algebraic approach and may not be 
expected as common from students in compulsory school. Hence, it was plausible that ISTs and 
their students aimed for arguments at level 3 (generic example). Thus, we found it relevant to 
explore project reports where IST had identified categories p3 or 3 in their students’ written 
dialogues. This could increase our knowledge of if the students actually reached p3 or 3, or if the 
identification made by IST was incorrect, and in that case what justification they provided. That 
would support us in further developments of the task instructions for future cohorts. 




There were 37 dialogues in the 2018 cohort, where ISTs identified either p3 or 3. In 2019, 
29 dialogues were identified as p3 or 3. The researchers identified category p3 in 42 of these 66 
dialogues, and they did not identify any of these dialogues to fully reach category 3. 
We divided the 66 dialogues into three groups, based on type of agreement between IST 
and the researchers. The first group consisted of dialogues of total disagreement, where IST had 
identified either p3 or 3, while the researchers had not. The second group consisted of dialogues 
of total agreement, where both IST and the researchers had identified p3. The third group consisted 
of “partial agreement”, where IST had identified 3 and the researchers p3. The distribution 
between these groups is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Comparison of identifications of p3 or 3 
 2018  2019 
Dialogue n %  n % 
Disagreement 18 49  6 21 
Agreement 8 22  14 48 
Partial agreement 11 30  9 31 
Total  37 100  29 100 
Note. Frequency of dialogues identified as category p3 or 3 by IST. 
 
The group of total disagreement decreased from 49% to 21%, between 2018 and 2019, 
while the group of total agreement increased from 22% to 48%. This finding indicated an 
improved quality of the identifications between 2018 and 2019. A χ2-test indicated this change to 
be significant (p < 0.05). 
This improvement remained, when we for the same 66 dialogues included all categories 
identified by ISTs and the researchers, respectively. When applying the algorithm for measuring 
disagreement, the mean value of the disagreements decreased from 2.281 in 2018, to 1.721 in 
2019. A t-test showed this change to be significant (p < 0.05). 
Identifications of category 0. We close the subsection dealing with research question 1, by 
highlighting the employment of category 0. In 2018, we discerned dialogues that did not deal with 
the task, which was to prove that the number of blocks for staircase n can be calculated by the 
‘formula’ n2. Such dialogues, or dialogues without any relevant argumentation for the validity of 
the formula, fall outside Balacheff’s taxonomy, that is category 0 in our analytic tool. In 2018, no 
dialogue was identified as category 0 by the ISTs, while the researchers identified 32 dialogues as 
category 0. This difference indicated a lack of understanding of Balacheff’s taxonomy by ISTs. 
For the 2019 cohort, the task instructions were improved, stressing that a dialogue may 
fall outside the four Balacheff levels. This resulted in a modest improvement. The 2019 ISTs 
identified five dialogues as category 0, while the researchers identified 23. 




ISTs’ justifications of their identifications 
In this subsection, we focus the 24 dialogues where ISTs identified either category p3 or 
3, the researchers neither nor. We explore what justifications ISTs suggested when they 
incorrectly identified these categories. Qualitative content analysis was used to highlight 
underlying themes in their justifications, which allowed for the interpretation of textual data 
through finding and coding themes. 
Two researchers independently analyzed and coded this subsample of 24 dialogues. Then, 
they organized themes and codes in a multifaceted codebook, in an iterative process using 
inductive and deductive approaches (Bryman, 2012). The process of having two researchers 
independently perform the coding of data, then compare and align, was used to improve the 
validity of coding. The outcome was five ‘tags’, which describe ISTs’ justifications of category 
p3 or 3. 
The first tag, ‘incorrect employment of category’, denoted that ISTs interpreted something 
as “generic example”, although it was not. This suggests ISTs had not understood what a generic 
example is. One example was the IST that wrote “This group is at level ‘generic example’, where 
they with a couple of simple examples show the solution to be true. They have given a general 
formula, answer = steps · steps.” Another example was “I mean that the dialogue and the proving 
is at level 2 ‘crucial experiment’ since she uses higher numbers for testing, and that she actually 
approaches level 3 based on what she says regarding that it is valid for all figure numbers.” In 
these two dialogues, ISTs used incorrect arguments for that the dialogues include generic 
examples. 
The second tag was ‘any figure used as warrant of p3 or 3’. Two examples were when IST 
wrote “Further, the students tried manipulatives, they drew a figure of the ‘steps.’ The students 
then applied the ‘generic example’…” and when IST wrote “This is a generic example, since it 
has a figure in addition to the calculation.” In these dialogues, the students had drawn just one or 
several pictures of a staircase, with no signs of rearranging the blocks into a square. This tag can 
be seen as a ‘subtag’ of the previous (‘incorrect employment of category’). However, the 
researchers found this misunderstanding to be of such importance that it should be a tag of its 
own. 
The third tag, ‘conjecture is used as argument’, can also be seen as a subtag of the first. 
One example was “Then he concludes that the formula is x · x and says he does not understand 
why. Here, I think he is searching for a generic justification.” A second example was “The 
dialogue is due to Balacheff in ‘generic example’, since the students are aware of the relation and 
from this were able to construct a formula to solve the task generally.” This meant no proof 
existed, but the construction or usage of the relation to be proved was interpreted as a generic 
example. 
The fourth tag was ‘wishful thinking’. This could be when ISTs used reasoning that was 
not in the written dialogue, for instance IST had heard the students discussing the point. The last 




tag was ‘doubtful.’ This was used when ISTs clearly expressed that they did not know if this really 
was any of category p3 or 3. 
Table 3 shows the frequencies of these tags in ISTs’ justifications. Note that more than 
one tag might be present in the same justification. 
 
Table 3 
Tags frequency dispersion 
Tags 2018a 2019b 
1. Incorrect employment of category 7 5 
2. Any figure used as warrant of p3 or 3 4 0 
3. Conjecture used as argument 8 2 
4. Wishful thinking 3 0 
5. Doubtful 3 3 
Note. aN=18. bN=6. Dialogues identified as category p3 or 3 by IST, where the researchers 
disagreed. 
 
The most frequent tag was ‘incorrect employment of category’, where seven dialogues in 
2018 and five dialogues in 2019 were categorised. The second most frequent was ‘conjecture used 
as argument’, with eight and two dialogues, respectively. For ‘any figure used as warrant for p3 
or 3’ the number decreased from four dialogues in 2018 to zero in 2019. This indicated an 
improvement from 2018 to 2019 regarding ISTs incorrectly justifying category p3 or 3 with 
‘conjecture used as argument’ and, in certain, ‘any figure used as warrant of p3 or 3’, while no 
clear improvement could be discerned for ‘incorrect employment of category’. 
 
Limitations 
Limitations of this study are mainly related to the small sample size and how to measure 
disagreement between IST and the researchers. When we scrutinised ‘the quality’ of ISTs’ 
identifications, we used our own identifications as a benchmark, highly aware there were no truly 
unambiguous ‘correct’ identification of the level of an argumentation (Zaslavsky, 2018), including 
our own. Although this is a potential concern, we presume that we as researchers can produce 
identifications that are ‘good enough’ to use as reference. 
Even if one agrees on using the researchers’ identifications as references, another concern 
was how to measure the disagreement between ISTs and the researchers. It can be argued both for 
and against the algorithm employed. Even if we regarded the algorithm as appropriate, we do not 
claim it is fully developed. For example, the values of the coefficients A, B and C can be changed. 
Considering changes in the algorithm might be relevant in future, similar investigations. We will, 
however, not further discuss that issue in this paper. 





Discussion and Implications 
Our first research question was: ‘How did the quality of in-service teachers’ proof level 
identifications of their students’ work with a reasoning-and-proving task change from 2018 to 
2019?’ The findings from our quantitative exploration of ISTs’ identifications of proof levels 
briefly suggested there has been an improvement of the general quality from 2018 to 2019. 
However, this improvement was not significant for the entire sample of 186 dialogues and the 
corresponding identifications. Thus, we cannot present an unambiguous result that shows the 
general quality of ISTs’ identifications did improve. We could, however, determine an improved 
quality in the subsample of 66 dialogues, where IST identified generic examples or incomplete 
generic examples. Our exploration showed their identifications to be of significantly higher 
quality in 2019 than in 2018. Because the assignment and the teaching model were unchanged, 
this improvement is likely to be related to the further development of the teacher educators’ 
preparation brief for the 2019-course. 
An interesting issue is ISTs identifying Balacheff levels in dialogues where no valid 
argumentation was present due to the taxonomy. Although a modest improvement of ISTs’ use of 
category 0 appeared from 2018 to 2019, a large discrepancy to the researchers’ remained. This 
indicates a potential for further improvement of future task instructions, so it becomes clear that 
not every argumentation is captured by the four Balacheff levels. Although we found the results 
from our first research question useful, results related to our second research question might be 
more gainful for future teaching.  
This question was: ‘What justifications do in-service teachers suggest when they 
incorrectly identify the proof level “the generic example” in students’ reasoning and proving?’ 
The most frequent tag was ‘Incorrect employment of category’, which shows there is a need to 
clarify what is required in argumentation to qualify as a generic example. It might, however, be 
rather difficult to grasp an abstract definition of the generic example and what constitutes a generic 
example (e.g. Doğan, 2020; Rø & Arnesen, 2020; Zaslavsky, 2018), which is a possible 
explanation of the rather small change of occurrence between 2018 and 2019.The tags ‘any figure 
used as warrant of p3 or 3’ and ‘conjecture is used as argument’ are more concrete concepts, 
although they, too, can be associated with a lack of understanding of the concept of generic 
example. These tags were clearly less frequent in 2019, which probably was a consequence of the 
improved instructions. One explanation could be that it was easier for ISTs to grasp instructions 
aiming to avoid errors spotted by these tags, than to interpret the abstract definition of a generic 
example, to avoid errors caught by ‘Incorrect employment of category’. Instructions like ‘just 
drawing some staircases is not enough to qualify as a generic example, it is necessary to show that 
the blocks can be rearranged to a square too’ and ‘just constructing or using the “formula” n2 is 
not enough’, are rather plausible. 
These observations will support further development of instructions. For example, there is 




still potential for improvement of the general description of the generic example, as well as what 
argumentation is required to fully qualify as a generic example. A better understanding of 
Balacheff’s taxonomy will not just have the potential to improve the performance in the course 
assignment, it may also improve ISTs’ own teaching about reasoning-and-proving in compulsory 
school. 
Previous research has shown ISTs’ knowledge of what counts as a valid proof to be 
insufficient (cf. Stylianides, 2016). Similar to the findings of Rø and Arnesen (2020), there were 
ISTs in our study using insufficient justifications for distinguishing empirical examples from 
generic examples, and complete generic proofs from incomplete. ISTs’ insufficient knowledge 
about generic examples enforces teacher educators to highlight this level of reasoning-and-
proving. 
Students’ stepping through the first two levels of proofs in Balacheff’s taxonomy may be 
of importance for their learning process. However, ISTs need awareness that these steps do not 
constitute any valid form of proof. While encouraging students when they engage in this type of 
reasoning-and proving, focus also needs to be given to the difference between empirical and 
generic argumentation, when aiming to help students step further (Rø & Arnesen, 2020). Since 
algebraic proofs are beyond the reach of most primary school students, argumentation involving 
generic examples is of importance in students’ learning process about proofs. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we focus on how teacher educators can prepare pre- or in-service teachers to 
promote their students in proving activities in compulsory school. Our implications are derived 
from the findings of this study that adapted the concept ‘a task, a method and a taxonomy’ (Wathne 
& Brodahl, 2019). The major challenges concern teacher educators’ instructions. These 
instructions should stress the overall awareness of the generality in proofs, and in particular 
emphasise how to support students in claiming generality in arguments, in order to prevent them 
from making incomplete generic examples in their writing. Further, the instructions have to guide 
ISTs in how to properly claim a given student argument to be either a generic or an incomplete 
generic example, in consideration of the criteria suggested by Reid and Vargas (2018), and Rø 
and Andersen (2020). 
As to our series of studies, the teacher educators’ preparations for the next course will 
utilise the experiences from this study, to enhance the concept and to achieve further progress in 
reasoning-and-proving for the future cohorts. 
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